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 1 
Convergence in Competition Fining Practices in the EU 
 
Niamh Dunne 
 
Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science.  Grateful 
thanks to Thomas Ackermann, Peter Dunne and several anonymous referees who 
provided most helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article.  Any errors remain my 
own.   
 
The need for increased convergence of the decentralised processes for public 
enforcement of EU competition law has received much recent attention.  Yet, 
missing from this debate is a convincing explanation as to why the goal of 
effective enforcement merits further harmonisation.  Focusing on fining 
practices for competition infringements, this article explores justifications that 
might be advanced to explain convergence; the legal or other means by which 
harmonisation could be achieved; and the choice of converged practices that 
might be implemented.  Whilst the strict necessity for convergence is less 
obvious than its desirability, the evolving structure of decentralised 
enforcement would arguably benefit from increased alignment.  Key concerns 
identified are the need to balance consistency with flexibility, and the 
reflection of a EU-wide consensus on fining practice. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Ensuring application of the substantive EU competitive rules, “effectively and 
uniformly,” is the key objective of competition enforcement under Regulation 
1/2003.1  This regulation sought, explicitly, to decentralise the enforcement of EU 
competition law, thereby involving national competition authorities (NCAs) and 
national courts to a greater extent in the application of these rules.2  In line with the 
orthodox division of competences for implementation of EU law, the NCAs apply the 
standard substantive rules—specifically, Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)—by reference to procedures and 
sanctions governed primarily by national law.  This bifurcated arrangement is 
considered to work well,3 yet national procedural autonomy has clear limits in this 
field.4  Amongst the areas where there have been calls for greater effectiveness and 
uniformity, this article focuses, specifically, on the claimed necessity for “increased 
convergence of the basic rules for fines” imposed by NCAs in respect of breaches of 
EU competition law.5   
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1/1, 4.1.2003) (hereafter “Regulation 
1/2003), Recital (1). 
2 European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the EC Treaty (Commission Programme No. 99/027), published 28 April 1999 (hereafter “1999 
White Paper”).  See also Case T-355/13 easyJet Airlines Co. Ltd v European Commission 
EU:T:2015:36, para.36: “…one of the main objectives of Regulation No 1/2003…is to establish an 
effective decentralised scheme for the application of EU competition rules.” 
3 See e.g. Wouter P.J. Wils, “Ten Year of Regulation 1/2003—A Retrospective,” 4 Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 293 (2013). 
4 See section IV(i) below. 
5 Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing competition enforcement by the  
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The aims here are to explore why such convergence might be necessary and how it 
can be achieved.  The broad task of “boosting enforcement powers” of NCAs is high 
on the policy agenda of the European Commission, and has been the subject of a 
public consultation process concluding in February 2016.6  Yet, beyond appeals to 
general notions of effectiveness and the desire to create a ‘level playing field’ for 
enforcement activity, the Commission has failed to articulate why, exactly, further 
EU-level harmonisation is merited.  Put simply, it is not entirely clear why the 
existing framework under Regulation 1/2003 should be considered deficient and thus 
in need of reform.  This article thus attempts to identify a more precise and 
convincing rationale for further legislative (or other) action leading to greater 
convergence, and to explore means by which this might be achieved.  Whilst 
divergences exist with respect to many aspects of the decentralised enforcement 
framework, our focus is the fining practices of the various competition authorities 
across the EU.  In addition to the fact that fines are, arguably, the most tangible and 
visible output of enforcement activity, the fining practices of the Commission, in 
particular, have been subject to much judicial scrutiny and academic discussion in 
recent year.7  Thus, fining practices are both of considerable practical importance in 
their own right and also provide a robust lens through which to examine the question 
of convergence more generally. 
 
The article is structured as followed.  After discussing the broader context of 
competition fines (section II) and delimiting the meaning of convergence in this area 
(section III), three key aspects are examined.  First, in section IV, we assess three 
rationales that may be advanced to explain the necessity of increased convergence of 
fining policies: namely, the principle of effectiveness; the existence of an agency 
relationship between the Commission and NCAs; and the need to achieve a ‘level 
playing field’ for sanctions.  Secondly, in section V, we consider the legal or other 
means by which convergence might be achieved, from voluntary efforts to Union 
legislation.  Finally, in section VI, we explore the choice of converged fining 
practices that may be implemented.  Whilst the strict necessity for greater 
convergence may be less obvious than its desirability, the article suggests that the 
evolving structure of decentralised enforcement can accommodate and would 
arguably benefit from increased harmonisation of fining practices.  The key concerns 
in devising a converged approach, therefore, are to balance consistency with sufficient 
flexibility, and to reflect a EU-wide consensus on fining practices, not merely a top-
down “re-centralisation” of sanctions. 
 
II. Fines for Breach of EU Competition Law: The Broader Context 
 
Before considering the question of further convergence of the decentralised processes 
of the NCAs, it is necessary to place the issue of fines for breach of EU competition 
law within its broader context.  Fines perform both deterrent and punishment-focused 
                                                 
Member States' competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues (SWD(2014) 231/2), 
published 9 July 2014 (hereafter “Enhancing competition enforcement”), para.77. 
6 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/5998, “Antitrust: Commission consults on boosting 
enforcement powers of national competition authorities,” published 4 November 2015. 
7 For a survey of contentious issues, see Lukas Solek, “Administrative and Judicial Discretion in 
Setting Fines,” 38 World Competition 547 (2015). 
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functions,8 with particular emphasis upon use of fines to dissuade and thus prevent 
future breaches by defendants (specific deterrence) and other economic actors 
(general deterrence).9 Article 103(2)(a) TFEU refers to fines as the primary means to 
“ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) and Article 102 
[TFEU]”.  The Court of Justice has taken a robust view of this provision, asserting 
that the substantive competition rules “would be ineffective if they were not 
accompanied by enforcement measures provided for in Article [103(2)(a)]…there is 
an intrinsic link between the fines and the application of Articles [101 and 102 
TFEU].”10  The Commission thus considers that, “[f]ines on undertakings are a 
central tool in the enforcement of the EU competition rules for both the Commission 
and the NCAs.”11  Where Articles 101 or 102 TFEU have been breached, fines should 
normally be imposed as a sanction.12   
 
Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission to levy fines for breach of 
these provisions.  The Commission has supplemented its acknowledged broad 
discretion in this regard13 with Guidelines that indicate more precisely the method to 
be followed in determining the amount of fines.14  The initial motivation for 
introduction of fining guidelines in 1998 was to increase the transparency and 
impartiality of the Commission’s fining practices.15  The further revision of this 
guidance in 2006 had the effect, most notably, of resulting in a significant uplift in the 
size of fines imposed.16   
 
The 2006 Guidelines specify a two-step methodology in setting the amount of fines.  
First, the “basic amount” is determined: this depends upon the value of sales affected, 
plus the gravity and duration of breach.17  Secondly, the basic amount may be 
adjusted upwards or downwards, to take account of aggravating factors—such as 
recidivism, refusal to cooperate with the Commission’s investigation, or playing a 
leadership role within a cartel—or mitigating factors—such as substantially limited 
involvement, negligent commission of the breach, or the influence of State 
regulation.18  The 2006 Guidelines also foresee the possibility that a fine may be 
further increased to ensure sufficient deterrence.19  Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 
imposes a legal maximum on any competition fine of 10 % of total turnover in the 
preceding business year of defendant undertakings, which is replicated in the 2006 
                                                 
8 Case C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/P/kantoor P v X BV EU:C:2009:359, para.33; and 
Enhancing competition enforcement, para.62. 
9 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches 
of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 167/19, 
13.6.2013), para.1. 
10 X BV, para.36 (emphasis added). 
11 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.62. 
12 Case C-681/11 Schenker & Co. AG EU:C:2013:404, especially paras.40 & 46. 
13 Case C-3/06 P Group Danone v Commission EU:C:2007:88, para.25. 
14 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)((a) of Regulation No 
1/2003 (OJ C 210/2, 1.9.2006) (hereafter “2006 Guidelines”). 
15 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 
and Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ C 9/3, 14.1.1998), p.3. 
16 Damien Geradin, “The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment” TILEC Discussion 
Paper No. 2011-052 (October 2011), pp.13-15. 
17 2006 Guidelines, paras.12-26. 
18 2006 Guidelines, paras.28-29. 
19 2006 Guidelines, para.30-31. 
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Guidelines.20  Finally, “exceptional” reductions are permissible where, in view of the 
“specific social and economic context…imposition of the fine as provided for in these 
Guidelines would irretrievably jeopardise the economic viability of the undertaking 
concerned.”21  In practice, this provision is interpreted narrowly.22 
  
Use of fining guidelines has approval of the Union Courts, which praise, inter alia, 
the resulting increase in legal certainty.23  In setting the amount of fines the 
Commission is bound to comply with the approach of the 2006 Guidelines, in order to 
respect the principles of equal treatment and legitimate expectations.24  Nonetheless, 
divergence from this methodology is permitted where considered necessary in view of 
“the particularities of a given case or the need to achieve deterrence”.25 Pursuant to 
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003,26 the Court of Justice has unlimited jurisdiction with 
respect to judicial scrutiny of fines, with full power to cancel, reduce or increase the 
amount imposed.  In doing do, the Union Courts may “substitute their own appraisal 
for the Commission’s,”27 something which occurs with frequency.28  Indeed, there is 
evidence that judicial challenges to the calculation of fines are more likely to succeed 
than against substantive findings of infringement,29 although this may be reflect, 
primarily, the margin of discretion afforded to the Commission in substantive 
assessments.  This plenary power of review is an important procedural safeguard to 
ensure effective judicial protection, given that it is an administrative agency—the 
Commission—rather than an independent judicial tribunal that imposes fines in the 
first instance.30  Nonetheless, in reviewing competition fines, the Union Courts too 
appear reluctant to depart from the methodology of the Commission’s Guidelines.31 
 
Current EU law is less prescriptive when it comes to fines imposed for infringements 
at Member State-level.  A key innovation of Regulation 1/2003 was to empower—
indeed, to require—the NCAs to apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU, alongside national 
competition laws, in cases where anti-competitive conduct has a potential effect on 
trade between Member States.  Yet Regulation 1/2003 engages in only light touch 
harmonisation of domestic procedural rules, including rules on sanctions.  Thus, 
                                                 
20 2006 Guidelines, para.32-33. 
21 2006 Guidelines, para.35. 
22 See e.g. Case T-236/01 Tokai Carbon v Commission EU:C:2004:118, para.375. 
23 Group Danone, para.23. 
24 See Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk 
Rørindustri and Others v Commission EU:C:2005:408, para.211, and Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v 
Commission EU:T:2005:367, para.523. 
25 2006 Guidelines, para.37.  Confirmed, inter alia, in Case C-194/14 P AC-Treuhand EU:C:2015:717, 
paras.65-67. 
26 Echoing the general power granted to the Union Courts pursuant to Article 261 TFEU. 
27 C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others EU:C:2012:684, para.62. 
28 See e.g. Takis Tridimas & Gabriel Gari, “Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A statistical analysis 
of judicial review before the European court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)” 35 
European Law Review 131. 
29 Peter D. Camesasca, Johan Ysewyn, Thomas Weck & Brian Bowman, “Cartel Appeals to the Court 
of Justice: The Song of the Sirens?” 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 215 (2013). 
30 Otis, para.63.  
31 Ioannis Lianos, Frédéric Jenny, Florian Wagner-von Papp, Evgenia Motchenkova & Eric David, 
“Judicial Scrutiny of Financial Penalties in Competition Law: A Comparative Perspective” CLES 
Research Paper Series 4/2014 (May 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542993, p.35. 
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Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003—“a very rudimentary rule”32—specifies that the 
NCAs “may take…decisions…imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other 
penalty provided for in their national law,”33—a provision that, despite its slightly 
ambiguous wording, can be interpreted to require the availability of fining powers.34  
EU law furthermore requires, more generally, that sanctions imposed by Member 
States to remedy breach of substantive EU law must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.35  At present, however, it is for each individual Member State to determine 
how, precisely, competition fines are calculated.   
 
Thus, importantly, there is no EU-level harmonisation of the mechanics of how the 
calculation of fines is carried out, nor of the relevant factors to be taken into account 
in performing this task.  Accordingly, NCAs may differ in their approaches to 
calculation of the basic amounts of fines, to adjustments for aggravating, mitigating 
and other relevant consideration, and to attribution of liability for fines to responsible 
legal entities.  In some Member States, it is even the case that the NCA may not have 
the legal power to impose fines itself, but instead must bring enforcement actions 
before domestic courts with fining jurisdiction.36  Challenges against fines occur 
through national structures for judicial review, while, in several Member States, 
fining powers are complemented by alternative sanctions, such as criminalisation. 
Consequently, although the NCAs enforce the same substantive rules across the EU, 
the procedures for imposition and review of sanctions, and even the level and types of 
sanctions that may be imposed, vary widely. 
 
Such heterodoxy is explainable by virtue of the general principle of national 
procedural autonomy, according to which, “in the absence of [EU] rules on this 
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the 
courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing 
actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from 
the direct effect of [EU] law”.37  Given the relative lack of EU-level harmonisation of 
the mechanisms and rules for enforcement of EU law, there is reliance upon—and 
deference to—domestic institutional arrangements and procedures.  Such deference is 
not unqualified: the rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights 
under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of 
                                                 
32 Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (SEC(2009) 574 
final), published 29 April 2009 (hereafter “2009 Report”), para.197. 
33 Regulation 1/2003, Article 5. 
34 This interpretation is supported, particularly, by the judgments in Case C-375/09 Prezes Urzędu 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele2 Polska sp. z o.o., devenue Netia SA. EU:C:2011:270, 
referring to “empowerment” of NCAs pursuant to Article 5—and, conversely, the fact that NCAs are 
not empowered to take decisions outside the scope of that provision (paras.21 and 27)—, and in 
Schenker, particularly para.35, which refers, from the perspective of NCAs, to “the measures of 
application which are provided for by [Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003]”. A contrary conclusion is, 
however, reached by Michael J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
(2014), p.13. 
35 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.62; citing Case C-68/88, Commission v Greece 
EU:C:1989:339, paras.23-25. 
36 Enhancing competition enforcement, paras.10-11. 
37 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland EU:C:1976:188, para.6. 
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effectiveness).38  In the context of competition enforcement at national level, the latter 
has proven potent as a basis for intervention.39  Moreover, the notion of national 
procedural sovereignty does not preclude bottom-up convergence by Member States 
coalescing around a “European model,” nor does it prevent the Union legislature from 
subsequently requiring greater harmonisation of procedural rules.  Nonetheless, 
provided that domestic structures for competition fines respect the requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness, considerable variance across the 28 distinct Member 
State regimes is permissible, and arguably unavoidable, absent further harmonisation.  
 
Two further centripetal forces must be noted.  First, the European Competition 
Network (ECN), which comprises both NCAs and the Commission, provides “a 
forum for discussion and cooperation in the application and enforcement of [EU] 
competition policy.”40 Expressly anticipated by Regulation 1/2003,41 the operation of 
the ECN is codified in a Commission Notice, which sets out, in particular, principles 
to guide the allocation of cases between members.42  Operation of the ECN is viewed 
as a particular success of the decentralised framework,43 and it provides an important 
forum for coordination between NCAs44 and general policy discussions.45  Secondly, 
the Association of European Competition Authorities (ECA) is a discussion forum for 
competition authorities in the European Economic Area, and thus encompasses the 
members of the ECN.  Less formalised and of less day-to-day importance than the 
ECN, it has a notable achievement for our purposes: the issuance, in 2008, of best 
practice guidelines for fining.46  As discussed below, the ECA fining principles have 
proven influential for amendments of NCA practice.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that fining practices are not the only issue in respect of 
which there is a potential need for greater harmonisation.  Indeed, in its 2014 Review 
of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission considered a wide range of areas where at 
least some Member States maintain suboptimal enforcement structures: from agency 
independence and adequacy of resources; to the availability of investigatory tools 
such as dawn raids; to leniency programmes; to decision-making powers and the 
ability to take necessary measures to conclude competition cases.47  Thus, divergences 
in the mechanics of fining are only one element of a decentralised enforcement 
framework that, to borrow an analogy from a recent Editorial Comment in this 
Journal, may be in need of more comprehensive “family therapy” to address emergent 
growing pains.48 
                                                 
38 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan EU:C:2001:465, para.29. 
39 See section IV(i) below.  
40 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ C 101/43, 
27.4.2004) (hereafter “ECN Notice”), para.1. 
41 See e.g. Regulation 1/2003, recitals 15-18. 
42 ECN Notice, particularly paras.5-30. 
43 Mihalis Kekelekis, “The European Competition Network (ECN): It Does Actually Work Well,” 
EIPASCOPE 2009/1 35. 
44 Abel M. Mateus, “Ensuring a More Level Playing Field in Competition Enforcement throughout the 
European Union” 31 European Competition Law Review 514 (2010), 517. 
45 Opinion of Advocate General Mazak in Case C-375/09 Tele2 EU:C: 2010: 743, para.37. 
46 European Competition Authorities, ECA Working Group on Sanction, Pecuniary sanctions imposed 
on undertakings for infringements of antitrust law: Principles for convergence, published May 2008 
(hereafter “ECA Principles”). 
47 Enhancing competition enforcement. 
48 Editorial Comment, “Public enforcement of EU competition law: Why the European antitrust family 
needs a therapy” 52 CMLRev 1191 (2015) 
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II. The Concept of Convergence in Fining Policies 
 
We turn now to consider precisely this issue of “increased convergence”49 of NCA 
fining practices. The meaning of convergence in this context must first be explored.  
In essence, the Commission has been concerned, for some time, about appreciable 
differences in the calculation and levels of fines imposed by NCAs.50  Although there 
is “a high level of voluntary convergence in the manner fines are being 
determined…with a large majority of authorities operating a similar basic 
methodology,...significant divergences still exist with regard to specific steps in the 
fines calculation”.51  That is, the mechanics by which competition fines are 
calculated, and the factors that are taken into consideration, differ widely across the 
practices of the various NCAs.  Consequently, in its 2014 Review, the Commission 
argued that it is “necessary to ensure that all NCAs have effective powers to impose 
deterrent fines on undertakings and on associations of undertakings,”52 which might 
require, inter alia, better alignment of the basic rules for fines.53 
 
The Commission’s call for increased convergence thus occurs against a background 
where considerable alignment of fining practices has already been achieved, primarily 
as a result of bottom-up efforts by Member States.  Van Cleynenbreugel observed 
that, in the classical understanding of the term, “[c]onvergence in and of itself implies 
a gradual alignment of national legal regimes.”54  The 2014 Review identified a 
number of areas where alignment has occurred, including: use of a basic amount 
premised on value of sales affected; consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; possible increases for deterrence; and use of a legal maximum for fine 
amounts.55  The influence on voluntary convergence of the Commission’s fining 
practices is unmistakable, particularly in respect of the broad contours of 
developments at national level.    
 
Accordingly, increased convergence as the term is deployed by the Commission must 
mean something more than the widespread—if piecemeal—approximation of fining 
practices across Member States that has occurred to date.  Thus, the 2014 Review 
identified notable continuing areas of divergence with respect to the specific 
mechanics of the fining practices employed by the NCAs, including: the bases used 
for calculating the basic amount of fines; the methods to take account of gravity and 
duration; interpretation of the maximum amount of fines; and the concept of 
undertaking, all of which could impact upon the actual amount of fines imposed.56  
Therefore, convergence as the term is used here must require greater consistency with 
                                                 
49 See fn.5 above. 
50 2009 Report, para.204; reiterated in Commission Staff Working Document, Ten Year of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 (SWD(2014) 230/2) (hereafter “Ten Years of Regulation 
1/2003”), published 9 July 2014, para.216. 
51 Enhancing competition enforcement, paras.68-71.  
52 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.77. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Pieter van Cleynenbreugel, “Institutional Assimilation in the Wake of EU Competition Law 
Decentralisation” 8 Competition Law Review 285 (2012), 300. 
55 Enhancing competition enforcement, paras.69-70. 
56 Enhancing competition enforcement, paras.71-76. 
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respect to the specific rules/practices adopted, or the degree of take-up by Member 
States, or both.  
 
Yet it is difficult—and, some might suggest, counterproductive—to suggest that 
convergence should equate to full uniformity in respect of the precise amount of fines.  
A degree of uncertainty is an integral element of the fining process as it is presently 
conceived of within the EU.  As Advocate General Kokott has argued, “[t]he 
calculation of fines is not a mechanical process by which it is possible…to predict the 
fine down to the last decimal point”.57  The justification for such in-built uncertainty 
is the need to counter strategic behaviour by would-be antitrust infringers: that is, if 
undertakings can make rational ex ante calculations of the expected amount of any 
competition fine should anti-competitive conduct be discovered, fines may be 
conceived of more readily as a ‘cost of doing business,’ and thus their deterrent effect 
would be diminished.58  The plausibility of this argument may be questioned, 
particularly as it conflicts with the ‘rational actor’ model that underlies the 
Commission’s own leniency programme.59  Yet, under the current approach to fines at 
EU level, increased convergence cannot translate into excessive predictability or even 
predetermined amounts for fines, insofar as this would be self-defeating.  As 
discussed, even within the relatively prescriptive framework of the 2006 Guidelines 
there is considerable scope for discretionary judgment, and thus variance in 
outcome.60  Insofar as the Commission’s approach presents the most likely model for 
“Europeanization”—a not-uncontroversial suggestion, as considered below—then full 
uniformity in the amount of fines, as opposed to the mechanics of fining practice, 
appears to be anathema.  It may, thus, be more appropriate to speak of coherence as 
opposed to uniformity of decentralised fining practices.61 
 
Nonetheless, increasing convergence makes sense when viewed in light of the 
centralising tendencies of EU competition law more generally—despite the apparent 
decentralising logic of Regulation 1/2003.62  Lasserre locates the desire for greater 
coherence of sanctions within a broader ambition to secure “consistency, effectiveness 
and predictability of EU competition law enforcement,”63 while Cengiz has described 
the pursuit of consistency as “almost…a dogma” here.64  Accordingly, convergence in 
fining might be viewed as a necessary component of coherent decentralised 
                                                 
57 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-439/11 P Ziegler EU:C:2012:800, para.120. 
58 Frese (2014), p.107, and Ioannis Lianos, Frédéric Jenny, Florian Wagner-von Papp, Evgenia 
Motchenkova & Eric David, “An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for Infringements of 
Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis” CLES Research Paper Series 3/2014 (May 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542991 (hereafter “Lianos et al. 
(2014)), pp.65-66. 
59 For a perceptive discussion of these conflicting trends, see Stephan & Nikpay, “Leniency Theory and 
Complex Realities” CCP Working Paper 14-8 (2015). 
60 Most obviously, in the explicit acceptance of potential divergence from the general methodology in 
paragraph 37 of the 2006 Guidelines. 
61 A distinction explored by Advocate General Mengozzi in his Opinion in Case C-429/07 X BV 
EU:C:2009:130—albeit the sometimes nebulous division between these concepts was acknowledged. 
62 “[C]ontrary to what is said on the tin, the effects of Modernisation are more complex than pure 
decentralization and it brings together both centripetal and centrifugal forces”: Firat Cengiz, Antitrust 
Federalism in the EU and the US, Routledge, Oxford (2012), p.187. 
63 Bruno Lasserre, “The Future of the European Competition Network,” Speech to the 21st St. Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum ICF, May 15-16 2014, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567620. 
64 Cengiz (2012), p.118. 
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enforcement, whereby there are a “multitude of enforcers throughout the EU,”65 yet 
where each applies the same rules to broadly equivalent—and appropriate—effect. 
 
IV. The Rationale for Convergence in Fining under EU Law 
 
The notion of increased convergence thus suggests a more coordinated (or even 
mandated) effort with respect to the mechanics by which competition fines are 
determined—with, consequently, increased similarity in fines levied across the EU.  
As such, it implies a concomitant departure from the norm of national procedural 
autonomy that has governed decentralised enforcement to date: so that centralised 
Union rules are substituted, to a greater or lesser extent, for diverse pre-existing 
national practices.  Such a departure is not entirely unusual: for instance, in the 
context of the (notably prescriptive) directives on liberalisation of EU electricity and 
gas markets, national regulators must be empowered to impose penalties for non-
compliance with regulatory obligations, up to a specified maximum of 10% of annual 
turnover.66  What is less clear, in antitrust context, is the underlying rationale to 
justify the need for greater convergence of fining practices.  The Commission, for its 
part, has sought to explain its tentative proposals for further harmonisation on the 
basis of a general need “to ensure the effective enforcement of EU competition rules 
by the NCAs”.67  Yet, it is not immediately obvious why greater convergence or even 
uniformity in terms of sanctions is necessary to render EU law fully effective, and/or 
how it may achieve that objective.  In this section, we consider a number of potential 
rationales for convergence, offering an assessment of both the apparent necessity and 
desirability of further harmonisation of fining practices across the EU on these bases. 
 
A. Arguments Against Convergence 
 
First, however, it is useful to note certain arguments against convergence, which 
reinforce the need for a convincing rationale for greater harmonisation in this context.  
A basic objection is that there is nothing so special about competition law sanctions to 
merit further incursions into the conventional procedural sovereignty of Member 
States.  Whereas, for instance, discrepancies between NCA leniency programmes may 
have direct negative effects on the system of decentralisation, diversity amongst 
national sanctioning rules is less capable of frustrating these arrangements.68  The 
principle of national procedural autonomy has been required to yield at numerous 
instances in competition enforcement, yet each departure has been grounded in 
broader arguments about the effectiveness of the application of EU competition law 
generally.  The extent to which such an argument might succeed is considered below. 
 
A second objection is based on the concept of regulatory competition, namely the 
process of rivalry between legislators or enforcers in different jurisdictions to produce 
the optimal regulatory framework.  This suggests that the ‘best’ fining practices are 
                                                 
65 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.42. 
66 See Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ L 211/55, 14.8.2009), Article 37(4)(d), and Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC 
(OJ L 211/94, 14.8.2009), Article 41(4)(d). 
67 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.6. 
68 Monique van Oers, “Fines and the Reform of European Competition Law: The View of a National 
Competition Authority” in Gerhard Dannecker & Oswald Jansen (eds.), Competition Law Sanctioning 
in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2004), 184. 
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likely to emerge through a process of trial and error, whereby the testing of different 
solutions in diverse situations enables the most effective principles to be uncovered.  
Thus, Cseres has argued that, insofar as a single ‘converged’ enforcement standard 
that encompasses all EU competition authorities is required, its development should 
occur organically through the competitive process, so that the most effective and/or 
efficient rules emerge.69  Conversely, the type of top-down convergence envisaged by 
the Commission may rule out future “national experiments” in terms of fining 
procedures,70 and thus may hinder beneficial “regulatory innovation”.71  This 
objection links particularly to the choice of converged standards, an issue considered 
further in section VI below. 
 
The desire to preserve scope for national preferences within the otherwise uniform 
enforcement structure provides another argument against mandatory convergence.  
Writing primarily from the standpoint of substantive EU competition law, Townley 
has argued in favour of so-called “coordinated diversity”, namely the idea that while 
the Union Courts may dictate the law, the Commission and NCAs should be 
permitted to “experiment in the gaps” around these rules.72  Specifically, he argued 
that a degree of diversity in implementation is the most effective means to address 
continuing differences about the “aims and methods” of EU competition enforcement, 
accommodating (to a degree) national preferences whilst enabling the development 
and sharing of best practices.73  Frese, focusing more narrowly on sanctions, put the 
issue in pointedly economic terms: decentralisation of fining allows Member States to 
provide for sanctioning powers that satisfy domestic demand.74  This is important 
insofar as there is a cultural dimension to sanctions.75  Again, this objection links 
closely to the choice of standards, considered below. 
 
Finally, there is an argument that “one size fits all’ solutions do not always succeed 
across a variety of Member States with different institutional frameworks and legal 
traditions.  For example, writing in the context of newer Member States, Cseres 
argues that the almost-direct transplantation of the Commission’s procedural rules and 
soft-law instruments for competition enforcement has not worked well in practice.76  
This objection relates both to the choice of standards and the legal or other means by 
which convergence is implemented, and may sound a more general warning in 
relation to the practical possibilities of greater harmonisation of processes in the 
absence of a fully federal enforcement structure. 
 
B. Arguments in Favour of Convergence 
 
Whilst bearing these objections in mind, nonetheless, increased convergence is firmly 
on the Commission’s agenda.  Three potential explanations for the claimed need for 
further harmonisation of existing decentralised fining practices will be explored: the 
principle of effectiveness; the possible existence of an agency relationship between 
                                                 
69 Cseres (2010). 
70 Frese (2014), p.248. 
71 Frese (2014), p.253. 
72 Christopher Townley, “Coordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law 
(and for EU Law, too),” 33 Yearbook of European Law 194 (2014), 243. 
73 Townley (2014), 221.  
74 Frese (2014), p.23. 
75 Frese (2014), p.256. 
76 Cseres (2014), pp.16-17. 
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the Commission and NCAs; and a ‘level playing field’ argument reflecting the 
principle of equality.  Notably, each possible rationale focuses upon a different 
element of the decentralised enforcement framework: emphasising the requirements 
of substantive competition law, the role of Member States, and the position of 
defendant undertakings, respectively.  It will be suggested that, ultimately, none of 
these would-be justifications presents an overriding case for the necessity of further 
convergence—but that does not mean that harmonisation is not desirable here.   
 
(i) The Principle of Effectiveness 
 
Since the Commission has explicitly linked the need for further convergence to the 
effective enforcement of EU competition law, it is logical to begin by considering the 
principle of effectiveness.  As noted, effectiveness is one of two qualifying principles 
that conditions the realisation of EU law at domestic level.  Specifically, effectiveness 
requires that Member States should not make the exercise of rights conferred by EU 
law practically impossible or excessively difficult.77  In relation to sanctions imposed 
for breach of EU law, although generally Member States retain discretion in this 
regard, any sanctions imposed must be sufficiently “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.”78  The principle of effectiveness also links to the fundamental right to 
effective judicial protection, guaranteed by the Charter,79 and relevant to both 
defendants and victims in the competition context.  At its core, the principle of 
effectiveness thus demands the availability of sufficiently robust national enforcement 
structures so that Member States can discharge their overarching obligation to secure 
the meaningful application of EU law within the domestic system.   
 
As a legal principle—and particularly as it has been deployed by the Court of 
Justice—effectiveness has had a profound influence on the development competition 
enforcement.  Most notably, in Courage the Court invoked the “full effectiveness” of 
EU competition law to derive a distinct right for private parties to claim damages for 
losses caused by breach,80 the potency of which has been reiterated repeatedly.81  
Effectiveness has also made inroads in public enforcement.  The language of 
effectiveness—specifically, effective application of EU competition law—permeates 
the entire text of Regulation 1/2003.82  Building upon this textual priority, in VEBIC 
the Court spoke of “the specific obligation on national competition authorities 
under…Regulation [1/2003] to ensure the effective application of Articles 101 TFEU 
and 102 TFEU.”83  Although Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 permits the domestic 
legal order to determine the structure and procedures of NCAs, the principle of 
effectiveness can nonetheless be invoked to expand, curtail or guide national 
enforcement jurisdiction to realise this objective.84  In VEBIC, it thus generated a right 
                                                 
77 Courage, para.29. 
78 Commission v Greece, para.24. 
79 See e.g. Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd EU:C:2007:163, particularly paras.42-43. 
80 Courage, para.26. 
81 See e.g. Case C-295/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA EU:C:2006:461, 
paras.60 & 90; Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG EU:C:2014:1317, 
paras.21 & 33; Cases C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt EU:C:2011:389, para.24, and C-
536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG EU:C:2013:366, para.31. 
82 See Recitals 1, 2, 5, 6, 8,12, 19, 25, 26, 28, 30 and 34, and Articles 7 and 35 of Regulation 1/2003. 
83 Case C-439/08 Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en 
Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW EU:C:2010:739, para.58. 
84 VEBIC, para.57. 
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for the Belgian NCA to participate in judicial proceedings against its own decisions, 
even though no such competence existed under national law.85   
 
Effectiveness was similarly a core concern in X BV and Schenker, both of which 
addressed the issue of competition fines.  X BV involved efforts by the Commission to 
intervene in a domestic tax case, pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.  In 
articulating an expansive right of intervention, the Court of Justice put effectiveness at 
the forefront, holding that, “[t]he effectiveness of the penalties imposed by the 
national or [Union] competition authorities on the basis of Article [103(2)(a) TFEU] 
is therefore a condition for the coherent application of Articles [101 or 102 
TFEU.]”86  Schenker is of even greater relevance.  Here, the Court considered the 
circumstances in which NCAs might impose competition fines, or, conversely, 
decline to do so.  Adopting a markedly restrictive approach to the apparent discretion 
of NCAs, it made repeated references to “the effectiveness of European Union law,”87 
the need “to ensure that Article 101 TFEU is applied effectively in the general 
interest,”88 and the requirement of its “effective and uniform application”.89  
Accordingly, the Court curtailed the ostensibly broad sovereignty of NCAs—
specifically, by limiting the circumstances where NCAs might refrain from imposing 
fines—in order to uphold the overriding (albeit amorphous) aim of effectiveness.  In 
doing so, moreover, it might be argued that the Court implicitly drew a link between 
the ultimate goal of effective enforcement and the need for a degree of equivalence 
across the discrete institutional structures that comprise the decentralised framework 
under Regulation 1/2003. 
 
Together, these cases demonstrate that the notion of the effective application of 
competition law may pertain both to the practices of the NCAs generally and, more 
specifically, to any fines imposed for breach.  It is clear, therefore, that effectiveness 
is a pivotal principle here.  The question, thus, is whether the obligations imposed by 
effectiveness alone may be sufficient to mandate harmonisation of the mechanics of 
fining practices amongst NCAs, as the Commission appears to envisage. 
 
An effectiveness argument could be constructed as follows: when NCAs impose fines 
for breach, such fines must be sufficiently effective, proportionate and dissuasive.  
Fines must therefore be set at a level proportionate to the breach concerned, with 
sufficient deterrent impact, and the effect of which ensures effective application of 
competition law.  The same substantive prohibitions apply across jurisdictions, and 
there is broad agreement about the factors that inform determination of fines.  Thus, 
effectiveness may require not merely the levying of fines at some generally 
appropriate overall level, but, rather, that a more precise fine be imposed which 
reflects the relevant elements of the breach concerned.  To achieve this degree of 
coherence, increased convergence of the methodology of calculating fines is 
necessary in order “to ensure that all NCAs have effective powers to impose deterrent 
fines”.90  That is, to the extent that the precise calculation of the ‘correct’—and, thus, 
sufficiently effective—fine must necessarily reflect various specific factors, it is 
                                                 
85 VEBIC, para.59. 
86 X BV, para.37. 
87 Schenker, para.36. 
88 Schenker, para.46. 
89 Schenker, paras.47 and 49. 
90 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.77. 
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necessary to ensure that all enforcers are empowered (indeed, obliged) to take such 
elements into account in the determination of competition fines.  In a decentralised 
enforcement structure with multiple parallel enforcers, in particular, there is 
compelling need for concrete coordination mechanisms to secure effective application 
across the EU.91  A parallel might be drawn to the detailed legislative harmonisation 
of fining powers of energy regulators;92 an unusual step linked expressly to a desire to 
increase the effectiveness of domestic regulation to support development of the 
internal energy market.93 
 
The difficulty with this argument, however, is that it is not immediately obvious why 
fines ought to be calculated in a uniform manner across the discrete enforcement 
practices of numerous competition enforcers in order to secure effective enforcement 
of competition law.  In the competition context, the principle of effectiveness has 
typically operated at a higher, more abstract level, although this is perhaps because it 
has often been the Court (not the Commission) that has taken the lead as 
“supranational standard-setter” here.94  Most frequently, effectiveness has applied to 
prevent Member States from applying domestic rules with contradictory effect, while 
the Court has generally refrained from specifying the precise rule to be applied 
instead.95  That is, the notion of the effective application of competition law has been 
relied upon primarily to articulate the parameters of domestic competition 
enforcement in broad (often negative) terms, rather than to specify (positive) national 
rules.96   
 
As the continued reliance on the doctrine of national procedural autonomy as the 
default approach to enforcement of EU law demonstrates, the mere fact of diversity in 
procedural terms does not imply incompatibility with substantive EU law.  This is so, 
even if we consider the potential use of the effectiveness principle as an affirmative 
basis for harmonising legislation, and not merely as a judicial tool by which to strike 
down or modify inadequate national measures.  Thus, it is plausible that the principle 
of effectiveness might be breached where a NCA is not equipped with sufficient 
sanctioning powers to impose a meaningful penalty in response to an infringement of 
EU competition law; it is rather less plausible that the mere fact that different 
agencies adopt different approaches to the calculation of such a penalty, in itself, 
could impair the effective enforcement of EU competition law.   
 
At most, therefore, effectiveness would appear to provide good grounds for requiring 
all Member States to equip their NCAs with sufficiently robust sanctioning powers.  
Yet, in the absence of convincing evidence that disparate fining practices substantially 
hinder the decentralised application of the competition rules in a meaningful 
manner—as distinct from the fairness point, considered below—the general principle 
of effectiveness appears to provides an insufficient mandate for a more general 
harmonisation of the mechanics of fining practices across the EU.  Specifically, it 
                                                 
91 See, to this effect, the Opinion in X BV, para.41. 
92 See fn.66 above. 
93 See Directive 2009/72/EC Recital (33), and Directive 2009/73/EC, Recital (29). 
94 Van Cleynenbreugel (2012), 290. 
95 For example, in VEBIC, effectiveness simply required that the NCA be empowered to participate in 
judicial proceedings; it retained discretion as to whether to exercise that right (see para.60). Similarly, 
in Schenker, effectiveness imposed certain constraints on the fining powers of the NCA, yet it too 
retained a considerable margin of discretion in exercising those powers. 
96 See also Editorial Comment (2015), 1196. 
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rather begs the question to assume that the principle of effectiveness mandates greater 
alignment of fining practices without explaining more fully how the latter engages the 
former.  Thus, it is suggested that the rationale for any deeper form of convergence, 
beyond merely imposing a minimum level of sanctioning power of NCAs, must be 
sought elsewhere. 
 
(ii) NCAs as Agents of the European Commission   
 
The second potential justification thus focuses on the constitutional structure of EU 
competition enforcement.  Specifically, it posits an agency relationship between 
NCAs and the Commission with respect to national enforcement.  The notion that the 
NCAs act as “agents” of the Commission is one that has found favour with 
commentators, but generally in a non-technical sense, to connote the expansion of 
enforcement jurisdiction under Regulation 1/2003.97  Here, by contrast, we consider 
the idea that NCAs act as agents in a ‘truer’ sense, i.e. that domestic enforcement of 
EU competition law takes place on behalf of the Commission, so that, for these 
purposes, the activities of the NCAs might be assimilated to the Commission’s 
enforcement jurisdiction.  As a result, this argument suggests, the NCAs should be 
bound not only to apply substantive competition law, as is clear from Regulation 
1/2003, but also to adhere to the procedural rules and standards of the Commission in 
its enforcement practice, including its approach to calculation of fines. 
 
In order to explain this argument further by analogy, it is necessary to expand upon 
the concept of agency within EU competition law.  Agency arises where one party has 
continuing authority to transact business on behalf and in the name of another.98  The 
existence of such a relationship between two economic entities—principal and 
agent—provides an exception to the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements 
between undertakings in Article 101(1) TFEU.99  Where there is sufficient “economic 
unity” between economic actors, only a single undertaking exists.100  Two interlinked 
features of agency bring it within the purview of the broader single economic entity 
doctrine: the absence of a competitive relationship between principal and agent, and 
the ability of the principal to determine the policy that the agent intends to adopt on 
the market.101  Agents are thus considered to “operate as auxiliary organs forming an 
integral part of the principal’s undertaking,”102 losing their own distinctive 
“character as independent traders”.103  Moreover, the principal may dictate the 
market conduct of its agent—for example, setting prices—without triggering 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU, because this is viewed as unilateral conduct.104   
 
                                                 
97 See e.g. Frese (2014), 45-46.  Conversely, political scientists are more likely to describe the 
Commission as agents of the Member States in this context: see, e.g., Dirk Lehmkuhl, “On 
Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy” 28 Journal 
of Public Policy 139 (2008). 
98 Okeoghene Odudu & David Bailey, “The Single Economic Entity Doctrine in EU Competition 
Law,” 51 CMLRev 1721 (2014), 1734. 
99 See e.g. C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio (CEEES) v 
Compañía Española de Petróleos SA EU:C:2006:784. 
100 CEEES, para.42. 
101 Odudu & Bailey (2014), 1726-27.  
102 CEEES, para.43. 
103 CEEES, para.43. 
104 CEEES, para.44. 
 15 
The significance of classifying the NCAs as ‘agents’ of the Commission, in a sense 
broadly equivalent to the agency concept, is to provide a rationale for convergence: 
specifically, it suggests that NCAs should apply the Commission’s well-developed 
framework for calculation of competition fines.  Under this viewpoint, Regulation 
1/2003 delegates some of the Commission’s own enforcement jurisdiction; so that, 
when NCAs enforce EU competition law, they act as if they are the Commission.  By 
analogy with the antitrust case-law, the NCAs are auxiliary organs of the Commission 
with respect to decentralised application of the competition rules, whose activities 
thus form an integral part of the Commission’s enforcement mission.  Much as a 
principal may dictate the economic behaviour of its agent, the Commission may set 
the parameters of domestic enforcement activity to the extent that NCAs act with 
delegated authority.  The logic of agency suggests that harmonisation of sanctions is 
not merely permissible but actually essential insofar as the outcome of NCA 
enforcement should be as if enforcement is by the Commission.   
 
Can the NCAs can be viewed as agents in this sense?  On the one hand, from the 
outset it was clear that, although Regulation 1/2003 sought to decentralise and expand 
EU competition enforcement, it did not challenge the Commission’s “leading role”.105  
The pre-eminence of its position is perhaps most obvious by reference to Article 11(6) 
of that regulation, under which, “[t]he initiation by the Commission of 
proceedings…shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their 
competence to apply Articles [101 and 102 TFEU].”  The NCAs thus lose their power 
to apply EU competition law where the Commission chooses to act,106 albeit the loss 
of jurisdiction is temporary.107  The Commission’s priority is reinforced by Article 16 
of Regulation 1/2003, which holds that NCAs and national courts cannot take 
decisions that run counter to Commission decisions applying Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU—a structural inequality, insofar as the Commission is not bound by equivalent 
domestic decisions.108 
 
On the other hand, Regulation 1/2003 expressly empowers the NCAs to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, seemingly in their own right,109 and describes the 
existence of concurrent jurisdiction as “a system of parallel powers”110—in 
contradistinction to delegated or derived powers.  “Close cooperation” between the 
Commission and the NCAs is mandated,111 implying greater reciprocity than one 
expects from an agency relationship.  A political (i.e. non-legally binding) Joint 
Statement of the Council and Commission goes even further, asserting that, 
“cooperation between the NCAs and the Commission takes place on the basis of 
equality, respect and solidarity.”112  Thus, in the 2014 Review, the Commission 
described the NCAs as “an essential pillar of the application of the EU competition 
rules,”113 reinforcing the idea of a standalone rather than subservient existence.  The 
                                                 
105 1999 White Paper, p.5. See also Opinion in Tele2, para.47. 
106 Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže 
EU:C:2012:72, para.70 
107 Toshiba, para.79. 
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109 Regulation 1/2003, recital (6) and Article 5. 
110 Regulation 1/2003, recitals (22) and (31). 
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112 Joint State of the Council and of the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition 
Authorities (15435/02 ADD 1), published 10 December 2002, para.7 (emphasis added).   
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autonomy of the discrete elements of the ECN system was similarly emphasised in the 
DHL judgment.114 
 
The operation of the ECN may belie this ostensible equality, yet it does not support an 
agency relationship as such.  Most commentators agree that the ECN has a 
hierarchical structure—in fact if not in law—in which the leading policy role is 
afforded to the Commission.115  This primacy is underlined by the enforcement 
priority afforded by Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003: although the ECN operates 
on the basis that “each network member retains full discretion in deciding whether or 
not to investigate a case,”116 the Commission is the only that may wrest jurisdiction if 
it chooses.  Thus, Lasserre spoke about a “hub and spoke” structure, with the “hub” 
role given to the Commission, at least in its earlier stages.117  Conversely, as the ECN 
evolved, many of its activities have become more horizontal.118  Recent cases before 
the General Court confirm and illustrate the Commission’s pre-eminence, but suggest 
considerable deference to national enforcement where appropriate.119  
 
Therefore, although the Commission enjoys a notable degree of priority and 
centrality, it is not possible to conclude that this amounts to an agency relationship in 
the sense required.  As Mateus described, the existing arrangement is pitched between 
two extremes: a fully centralised approach involving a federal agency with a network 
of delegations in each Member State, representing the federal body; versus a totally 
decentralised approach involving only the NCAs and some co-ordinating body for 
EU-wide cases.120  Neither represents the current structure—NCAs do not have fully 
free rein with respect to enforcement, but nor are they bound entirely by the 
Commission.  Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to maintain that the 
hierarchical nature of the relationship between the Commission and NCAs mandates a 
single uniform approach to fining across the numerous enforcers, national and 
supranational, which are empowered to apply EU competition law at present.   
 
(iii) A ‘Level-Playing Field’ and the Principle of Equality 
 
The third and final argument to consider is the need for a so-called “level playing 
field” in fining practices across the EU, primarily to benefit defendants.121  The 
pursuit of a more level playing field for economic actors is a core goal for the revised 
enforcement framework under Regulation 1/2003: both by expanding the reach of 
uniform EU competition law, as distinct from disparate national rules; and ensuring a 
                                                 
114 Case C-428/14 DHL Express (Italy) Srl EU:C:2016:27. 
115 See, particularly, Townley (2014), 222-225; also Kati Cseres, “Comparing Laws in the Enforcement 
of EU and National Competition Laws,” 3 European Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2010); Firat Cengiz, 
“Multi-level Governance in Competition Policy: The European Competition Network” 35 European 
Law Review 660 (2010), 664. 
116 ECN Notice, para.5. 
117 Lasserre (2014), p.1  
118 Cseres (2014), p.12. 
119 See e.g. Case T-355/13 easyJet Airlines Co. Ltd v European Commission EU:T:2015:36 and Case 
T-201/11 Si.mobil telekomunikacijske storitve d.d. v European Commission EU:T:2014:1096, and 
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120 Mateus (2010) 515-516.  
121 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/5998, “Antitrust: Commission consults on boosting 
enforcement powers of national competition authorities,” published 4 November 2015. 
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more consistent application of those prohibitions by various enforcers.122  This 
argument was also prominent in the passage of the Antitrust Damages Directive, both 
in respect of victims of competition breaches and undertakings that infringe 
competition law.123  The notion of a level playing field, here, implies a degree of 
homogeneity with respect to fines imposed by the various NCAs, which necessarily 
requires further convergence in comparison with existing approaches.  This argument 
has two components: first, the need for greater clarity and certainty with respect to 
fines that may be imposed for breach of EU competition law across different 
jurisdictions; and second, a more abstract notion, grounded in the principle of 
equality, that equivalent breaches should attract equivalent punishment.  Whilst the 
first aspect provides a relatively weak rationale for convergence, it is suggested that 
the principle of equality is a more convincing justification for harmonisation in this 
context. 
 
First, the notion of a level playing field engages the principle of legal certainty, which 
requires, inter alia, that rules of EU law must enable those concerned to know, ex 
ante, the extent of obligations imposed on them.124  Thus, it might be argued that 
undertakings are entitled to know in advance, as a counterpart to the substantive 
competition prohibitions, how public enforcers would address any breaches, including 
with respect to fines.  Lasserre has spoken about “the blurred message sent out to the 
business community as well as to consumers,” insofar as the same substantive rules 
may see imposition of very different sanctions by public enforcers across different 
jurisdictions.125  Such ambiguity is heightened by the largely discretionary nature of 
case allocation under the ECN Notice, which makes it difficult for undertakings to 
predict in advance the competition agency (or agencies) that may address their 
case.126  Increasing legal certainty by reducing differences between the approaches in 
different Member States was also an express objective of the Antitrust Damages 
Directive, albeit that legislation focused upon ensuring that consumers may exercise 
their right of private action where appropriate.127 
 
An argument based on legal certainty is weak in this context, however.  Regulation 
1/2003—and especially Article 3 thereof, which establishes when and to what extent 
EU competition law is applied by NCAs—has clarified, largely, the substantive legal 
                                                 
122 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC0 No 2988/74, 
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rules that apply to market behaviour, while the jurisprudence of the Union Courts and 
policy guidance issued by the Commission expands upon the content of those 
prohibitions.  Undertakings are, to a large extent, already aware of the limitations 
placed on economic freedom by EU competition law.  Moreover, it is firmly 
established that breach of these provisions normally attracts a fine,128 unless 
commitments are accepted in lieu.129  Thus, the obligations imposed by EU law—and 
the possibility of sanctions—are generally known.  The fact that the precise fine that 
may be levied is unforeseeable in advance is not a legal certainty problem, but is 
instead an inherent characteristic of antitrust fining practices.  As the Union Courts 
acknowledge, the adoption of fining guidelines by many competition agencies has 
increased certainty and clarity ex ante as to the likely fine to be imposed ex post.130  
To the extent that uncertainty continues, inevitably, to exist, we might question 
whether infringing undertakings have any legitimate claim for greater certainty 
regarding the consequences of unlawful actions: much as Advocate General Kokott 
doubted, in her Opinion in Kone, whether we should worry about “black sheep” being 
dissuaded from participation in the internal market due to a robust right of private 
action.131 
 
Yet, where the level playing field argument is understood as requiring equal 
punishment in terms of fining, and thus links to the principle of equality, it becomes 
more compelling.  As a general principle of EU law, equality—also known as equal 
treatment or non-discrimination—requires, essentially, that comparable situations not 
be treated differently and that different situations not be treated the same.132 Applying 
this logic to competition fines, this suggests the need for a degree of equivalence and 
consistency with respect to punishment of similar infringements, and, conversely, 
principled divergence with respect to dissimilar breaches.  This is particularly so 
given that, when NCAs enforce EU competition law, they apply the same uniform 
rules and must follow the interpretations of the Court of Justice133 and the 
Commission.134  Much as the 10% turnover cap for competition fines arguably 
reflects some view of the cardinal or absolute proportionality of sanctions,135 
consistency in the calculation of individual fines is necessary to ensure ordinal or 
relative proportionality in such cases.136   
 
Unlike the situation where NCAs apply domestic competition law, enforcement 
activity by different NCAs and the Commission pursues the same end.137  As a matter 
of substantive antitrust, it is possible for different NCAs to find that different 
                                                 
128 Schenker, para.40. 
129 See Regulation 1/2003, Articles 5 & 9. 
130 See fn.23 above. 
131 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur 
AG. EU:C:2014:45, para.68. 
132 Joined Cases 117/76 & 66/77 Ruckdeschel EU:C:1977:160, para.7; for a recent restatement in the 
competition context, see Case C-580/12 P Guardian Industries v Commission EU:C:2014:2363, 
para.51. 
133 Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others EU:C:2012:795. 
134 Regulation 1/2003, Article 16(2). 
135 Cardinal proportionality requires that a reasonable proportion be maintained between overall levels 
of punitiveness and the gravity of an offence: see Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionality in the 
Philosophy of Punishment” 16 Crime and Justice 55 (1992), 83. 
136 Ordinal proportionality requires that penalties be scaled according to the comparative serious of 
individual offences: see von Hirsch (1992), 79. 
137 Contrast the approach in Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm EU:C:1969:4, particularly paras.3 & 11. 
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undertakings have committed, effectively, the same infringements.  It is generally 
acknowledged that the severity of any competition breach depends upon, inter alia, 
whether it might be classified as hardcore or non-hardcore, alongside its market 
impact.138  To the extent that it is possible to identify consistent criteria to determine 
the appropriate level of fines, where NCA sanctioning practice varies widely in 
respect of equivalent breaches then, arguably, equality is not respected.  That is, 
although undertakings are in comparable situations—for example, of a similar size, 
with equivalent gravity of breach, and/or the value of sales affected is similar—
unequal treatment arises due to variance in sanctions.  Surveying fining practices 
across the NCAs and the Commission, Geradin criticised the absence of “any valid 
justification” for the imposition of different sanctions for breach of the same 
prohibitions, depending solely on the enforcement agency involved.139 At its core, the 
equality objection is fairness-based: as Dannecker & Kortek put the point robustly, “it 
contradicts any sense of fairness that different sanctions are provided for offences 
against the same provisions”.140 
 
This conclusion may be challenged in several ways.  In the context of general 
criminal law, for instance, it is undeniable that different jurisdictions can impose 
different penalties for largely similar crimes.  Indeed, it can even be the case—as in 
Germany, for instance—that different judicial institutions within the same federal 
system may impose different levels of punishment for equivalent crimes.141  Yet, the 
mere fact that such apparent unfairness exists in other areas of law enforcement does 
not excuse or legitimate its existence in competition law. 
 
The remedial practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) provides a 
further challenge to the notion that the principle of equality requires equal fining 
levels across a multitude of jurisdictions with different social and market conditions. 
The ECtHR adjudicates on human rights breaches of often-equivalent severity by 
sovereign States that are equal in status under international law, with the power to 
award “just satisfaction” where appropriate. When awarding damages, however, it has 
sometimes differentiated between breaches committed by richer and poorer state 
parties, reflecting relative differences in the value of money.142  Applied to the 
competition context, this rationale might support the argument that fines should vary 
across Member States to reflect differing market sizes and underlying social and 
economic circumstances.  Yet, the logic of this differential approach does not conflict 
with greater convergence.  On the one hand, damages awarded by the ECtHR aim at 
restitutio in integrum, that is, to return the claimant to the position that he/she was in 
before breach,143 which is inherently likely to vary across a variety of domestic 
circumstances.  On the other, current competition fining practices in most EU 
                                                 
138 See the extended discussion of the components of competition fines in Lianos et al (2014). 
139 Geradin (2011), p.35. 
140 Gerhard Dannecker & Yasemin Körtek, “General Report” in Gerhard Dannecker & Oswald Jansen 
(eds.), Competition Law Sanctioning in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
(2004), p.99. 
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142 See e.g. the discussion in Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Damages under the  
Human  Rights  Act 1998 (Law Com No.266/Scot Law Com No.180/Cm 4853), published October 
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jurisdictions base the starting amount of fines on the value of sales affected, which, 
again, inevitably varies depending upon the size and value of the market(s) concerned 
plus the market share of defendants.  In this manner, the ‘conventional’ approach to 
competition fines already accounts for economic differences across the internal 
market. 
 
The claim that the principle of equality provides a convincing rationale for greater 
alignment of fining practices across EU competition enforcement is not quite the 
same as arguing that it necessitates harmonisation as a matter of law.  To the extent 
that issues of equality have arisen with respect competition fining practices to date, 
the principle has generally been invoked as a shield against fines levied by the 
Commission.  It is thus typically deployed to ensure that, where several entities are 
each fined for participation in a single breach, the bases used for calculation of fines 
are equivalent.144  Conversely, beyond the Commission’s duty to respect its own 
guidelines, the principle of equality has not been applied to require that any particular 
level of fines be imposed in comparison with other breaches.145  In Compagnie 
générale maritime, the General Court asserted that “[t]he principle of equality of 
treatment cannot be invoked where there is illegality,” so that the fact that the 
Commission did not impose fines in respect of one competition infringement did not 
prevent fines being imposed on perpetrators of similar breaches.146  That is, where an 
undertaking violates Article 101 or 102 TFEU, the principle of equality does not 
appear to generate any entitlement, in law, to a specific ‘ordinal’ level of sanctions, 
even in comparison with equivalent breaches.   
 
Following this logic, it is difficult to conclude that, if viewed purely in terms of its 
strict legal requirements, the principle of equality provides a convincing justification 
for more detailed harmonisation of the framework deployed when setting competition 
fines.  Nonetheless, such a development may be viewed as highly desirable,147 
particularly in light of the risk of unequal treatment—of basic unfairness, 
essentially—where similarly situated undertakings are subject to widely differing 
fining practices for breach of the same EU-level prohibitions.148  In determining 
whether further convergence should be pursued, it is necessary to balance the 
expected benefits of harmonisation—greater coherence and fairness in implementing 
competition law—against the possible disadvantages considered above, as well as the 
reality that harmonisation of domestic procedures is the exception within the EU 
framework.  Although greater uniformity would generate certain advantages, it is not 
yet clear that these benefits would merit the considerable efforts that may be required 
to achieve further harmonisation, nor that this is a situation where reliance upon 
national procedural autonomy is obviously deficient.  
 
V. Mechanisms to Achieve Convergence 
 
                                                 
144 See e.g. Cases C-628/10 P & C-14/11 P Alliance One International EU:C:2013:606, and Guardian 
Industries.  
145 Discussing the (limited) effect that the principle of equality has in the context of competition 
enforcement, see Katharina Voss, “The Principle of Equality: A Limit to the Commission’s Discretion 
in EU Competition Law Enforcement?” [2013] Global Antitrust Review 149. 
146 Case T-86/95 Compagnie générale maritime v Commission EU:T:2002:50, para.242. 
147 See e.g. Mateus (2010), 526. 
148 See also Editorial Comment (2015), 1195. 
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Having concluded that greater convergence in terms of fining practices may desirable 
on balance, yet without finding any overriding explanation for its necessity as such, 
we turn to consider how this might be achieved.  Three possible mechanisms, of 
increasing levels of ambition, are considered: voluntary convergence; convergence 
through Commission action; and convergence through Union regulation. 
 
(i) Voluntary convergence 
 
Voluntary convergence occurs where “Member States decide to align their 
procedures and/or sanctions with a common EU model, despite the absence of 
harmonisation by legislation.”149  It is akin to self-regulation: Member States 
relinquish a certain quantity of national procedural autonomy by bringing their 
domestic frameworks into line with the centralised archetype.  Voluntary convergence 
is, largely, a bottom-up rather than top-down process, relying upon efforts by 
individual Member States.150  Nonetheless, it requires a degree of centralisation, 
insofar as individual Member States necessarily coalesce around identifiable central 
standards.  In the context of decentralised competition enforcement, moreover, the 
Commission often takes a proactive role in encouraging this ostensibly organic 
process to occur.151 
 
Considerable voluntary convergence of fining practices has already taken place, as the 
Commission recognises.152  Numerous drivers of convergence can be identified: the 
effects of decentralisation under Regulation 1/2003; comparisons with Commission 
procedures and those of peer NCAs; and co-operation through the ECN.153  Indeed, 
Cengiz posits “a symbiotic relationship between the EU competition rules and the 
national procedural regimes…[that has] accelerated the process of voluntary 
harmonisation.”154  Frese, viewing the prospects of voluntary convergence in a 
particularly positive manner, suggests that, eventually, all disparities between NCA 
fining practices “may have levelled out as a result of ECN co-ordination.”155 
Voluntary convergence has much to recommend it: it respects and harnesses the 
sovereignty of Member States; it avoids the need for centralised political agreement, 
and thus the likely necessity for compromise; and the solutions adopted are likely 
(though not inevitably) to prove a better fit within the adoptive system. 
 
As a vehicle by which to achieve convergence as envisaged here, however, reliance 
upon voluntary efforts has obvious limits.  In particular, the absence of coordination 
or compulsion with respect to existing centripetal forces means that, almost 
unavoidably, voluntary convergence lacks the uniformity of outcome that the 
Commission appears to anticipate.  Unless there is both a defined central standard and 
some coercion or necessity in terms of achieving this goal, it is unlikely that, with 28 
domestic enforcement systems, such consistency is achievable.156  This is borne out 
by experiences to date.  At present, multiple centripetal forces already exist within the 
                                                 
149 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.48. 
150 See e.g. van Cleynenbreugal (2012), 299-300. 
151 Cseres (2010); Cseres (2014), p.14 & 19. 
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decentralised structure, including the activities of the ECN and ECA, alongside the 
presence of the Commission’s enforcement framework as a would-be archetype.  Yet 
reliance upon voluntary convergence has not brought full consistency.  Thus, as the 
2014 Review notes, although there has been significant voluntary alignment of 
Member State procedures since the advent of Regulation 1/2003,157 the degree of 
convergence differs, and divergence continues to exist even in relation to fundamental 
powers.158  Moreover, the absence of any binding interpretation of the underlying 
concepts means that divergences may re-emerge when these rules are applied (or, 
especially, challenged judicially) at national level.159  If the Commission wishes to 
exceed what has been achieved to date, simply waiting for Member States to coalesce 
around some amorphous preferred standard is unsuitable.  
 
(ii) Convergence spearheaded by Commission action 
 
In light of the limited prospects of success for further voluntary convergence, to what 
extent might the Commission, acting alone, mandate greater convergence?  As 
explained above, despite the decentralising objectives of Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission retains a central—arguably, hierarchically superior—position within the 
enforcement structure of EU competition law.  Moreover, within this framework, the 
Commission has an acknowledged “special role…in ensuring the consistent 
application of the competition rules.”160  Conversely, as the Court of Justice has 
recently clarified, the ECN does not have the power to adopt legally binding rules.161 
Given the Commission’s contention that increased convergence is necessary, the 
question is whether it has the capacity itself to require such harmonisation. 
 
The key difficulty is that the Commission does not possess a full range of coercive 
powers in the sphere of competition, in order to require deviation from the Member 
State prerogative of national procedural autonomy.  Most obviously, it lacks a ‘hard’ 
legislative power that would enable it to enact legislation requiring the NCAs to adopt 
harmonised fining practices.  Article 106(3) TFEU, the most extensive legislative 
power of the Commission in the realm of competition, empowers it to adopt 
Directives or Decisions addressed to Member States, but only in respect of 
implementation of the first and second paragraphs of that provision.  Any such 
legislation requires a plausible link to the application of competition law to public 
undertakings, undertakings granted special or exclusive rights by the State, and/or 
provision of services of general economic interest.  This necessary connection 
provides little scope for use of Article 106(3) TFEU as a legal basis for legislating in 
respect of fining powers more generally.   
 
Additionally, although the Commission’s enforcement guidance binds its own 
practices, these obligations do not extend to enforcement by NCAs.162  A distinction 
thus exists between substantive competition law, which unquestionably is binding at 
Member State-level, and rules of a more procedural nature that condition the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the Commission, which do not bind 
                                                 
157 Enhancing competition enforcement, para.48. 
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NCAs as such.163  Consequently, although the Commission has adopted relatively 
comprehensive guidelines that shape and limit its own practice, the existence of such 
guidance has no mandatory effect on NCAs.  Moreover, in the absence of more 
general legislative powers for the Commission—beyond the specificities of Article 
106(3) TFEU—it has limited options, acting alone, to impose its preferred fining 
mechanics on Member States. 
 
Perhaps the strongest antitrust-specific power of the Commission, and certainly the 
one that emphasises its hierarchically superior position within the enforcement 
framework, is its prerogative of enforcement priority, reflected in Article 11(6) of 
Regulation 1/2003.  Article 11(6) explicitly anticipates that the Commission may 
initiate proceedings where a case is being dealt with by a NCA, and its second 
sentence confirms that the Commission retains the power (and priority) to do so, 
although it must consult—but not obtain the consent of—the NCA concerned.  This 
power is complemented by an obligation upon NCAs, under Article 11(4) of that 
regulation, to inform the Commission at least 30 days in advance of, inter alia, any 
contemplated infringement decision—with, concomitantly, the likelihood of fines 
being imposed.  This raises the possibility that the Commission might invoke its 
power of priority to initiate EU-level infringement proceedings, and thereby short-
circuit on-going national proceedings, where it deems the anticipated fine to be 
inappropriate.164   
 
As a means of securing increased convergence this is, undoubtedly, a circuitous one.  
Yet, were the Commission to deploy its powers in this manner occasionally, this 
could, in theory, bring two benefits.  First, where a contemplated fine diverges 
markedly from standard EU-wide practice, it would provide a means by which to 
prevent such outliers from taking effect.  Secondly, future fining by NCAs would take 
place in “the shadow of hierarchy,” that is, against a background where it is known 
that overt deviations might prompt Commission intervention.165  This could have 
considerable dissuasive effect, and thus prompt further bottom-up convergence.  
Indeed, the ECN Notice expressly anticipates use of Article 11(6) where there is a 
need “to develop [EU] competition policy…to ensure effective enforcement”.166 
 
For two reasons, however, this theoretical possibility provides a weak basis to achieve 
convergence.  First, the power to usurp the NCAs contained in Article 11(6) is an 
exceptional one, to be exercised sparingly by the Commission.167  It is unlikely, in 
circumstances where the NCA’s substantive assessment with respect to application of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU presents no problem, that the Commission would deem the 
matter sufficiently compelling to intervene simply because it disagreed with the 
mechanics of the calculation of the fine.  The fact that there is already a degree of 
convergence with respect to fining practices makes it less likely, additionally, that a 
fine so egregiously out of line with the Commission’s own preferred approach might 
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arise.  As the General Court observed in easyJet, primary responsibility for reviewing 
decisions taken by NCAs should lie with national courts rather than the 
Commission;168 this logic extends to the acceptability of fines.  Unless the approach 
to Article 11(6) changes radically—and, for reasons both of comity and feasibility, 
this appears unlikely—it is doubtful whether this theoretical possibility might become 
practical reality.  Second, again to the extent that rather detailed convergence is 
required, this approach is unlikely to secure full consistency in fining practices.  
Although the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ concept may bring a harder edge to the effects, 
essentially this remains a situation of would-be voluntary convergence, which, as 
discussed, is likely to be insufficient here.  
 
Finally, within the EU constitutional structure, the Commission possesses, almost 
exclusively, the right of legislative initiative.  It is within this context that it may have 
the greatest likelihood of success in terms of increasing convergence—even though 
the Commission itself may not be involved in the formal legislative process in such 
circumstances. 
 
(iii) Convergence through Union legislation 
 
Thus, we turn to the option of convergence through concrete “hard” law: namely, the 
possibility that Union legislation might be enacted to oblige Member States to align 
fining practices.  In addition to providing the strongest basis for comprehensive and 
consistent alignment, mandatory EU legislation may be the only means by which 
NCAs in certain Member States can be empowered fully to impose administrative 
fines for antitrust infringements.169 Several aspects must be considered: the potential 
legal bases for legislation, and whether further regulation would prove legally feasible 
or politically acceptable here. 
 
a. Legal Bases 
 
Article 103(1) TFEU empowers the Council to enact “appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU],” 
acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation with the Parliament.  
This legal basis is sufficiently broad to encompass harmonisation of fining practices; 
indeed, Article 103(1) provided the legal basis for (relatively minimalist) 
harmonisation under Regulation 1/2003.  Insofar as there is an “intrinsic link” 
between application of substantive competition law and the imposition of fines,170 
such legislation appears to fall squarely within the purview of Article 103(1) TFEU.  
The key objection is, however, that it omits the Parliament from the legislative 
process, an omission that proved fatal in the context of the Antitrust Damages 
Directive.171  Given that the envisaged legislation would necessarily impose detailed 
requirements on NCAs, and thus represent a considerable incursion into the domain of 
national sovereignty, it might be considered “undemocratic” to exclude the 
Parliament. Certainly, in the context of the Antitrust Damages Directive, such a 
prospect was viewed as politically untenable.  Conversely, it might be argued that the 
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subject matter of the proposed legislation here is more technical in nature, and thus 
unlikely to expose the sort of intra-Union disparities or generate the degree of 
controversy that arose in relation to the earlier directive, which affected more 
politically sensitive aspects of private law.   
 
An alternative legal basis could be found in Article 114 TFEU, which allows for 
“approximation” of Member State laws that “have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market.”  Article 114 TFEU involves both the Council 
and the Parliament,172 and provides a wide-ranging basis for harmonization.  
Nonetheless, it requires that the legislation at issue demonstrate some reasonably 
plausible connection to the development of the internal market.173  In the context of 
the Antitrust Damages Directive, such a link was posited by virtue of the need to 
develop a level-playing field for market participants.174  The speculative claim that 
national variations with respect to private damages actions might operate as a 
disincentive to establishment and provision of services in Member States with more 
robust regimes for private competition enforcement can be queried,175 yet it suggests 
that a relatively low threshold for plausibility in terms of reliance upon Article 114 
TFEU is accepted.176  Here, although somewhat abstract and tenuous in nature, it 
might be argued that greater coherence (and consistently adequate levels) in terms of 
fining across the Member States may enhance the effectiveness of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, and thus further help secure the open and undistorted competition that 
underpins the internal market.   
 
Finally, an additional potential legal basis might be provided by Article 116 TFEU, 
which empowers the Parliament and Council to enact legislation under the ordinary 
procedure where “a difference between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States is distorting the conditions of competition in 
the internal market and…the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated”.  Intended as 
a “positive integration platform for the EU’s competition policy,” little use has been 
made of this legal basis to date despite its early inclusion within the Treaty 
framework.177  However, its textual specificity would appear to make it a relatively 
strong candidate here, should the link to the functioning of the internal market as 
required by Article 114 TFEU prove simply too tenuous in this instance. 
 
Articles 103(1), 114 and 116 TFEU each allow for adoption of either regulations or 
directives to secure greater convergence.  It is suggested, however, that a regulation 
would be most appropriate to achieve the degree of harmonization required.  In 
particular, the mechanics of devising and imposing fines are technical and specific: 
for this sort of task, the more prescriptive approach of harmonizing by regulation is 
usually preferable.  As the Antitrust Damages Directive demonstrates, harmonization 
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by directive can leave considerable leeway for national divergences, even where the 
same broad structures are in place:178 this is essentially the situation that exists at 
present with respect to NCA fining practices, and which the Commission deems 
unacceptable.  Conversely, the decision to proceed by directive rather than regulation 
may demonstrate greater respect for—and deference to—Member State sovereignty, 
and thus may be more acceptable, both in terms of the legal principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, and in order to generate political support.  It is to these latter 
issues we now turn. 
 
b. Subsidiarity and proportionality 
 
Assuming a legitimate underlying policy objective, the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality impose additional requirements on EU legislative activity.  The 
principle of subsidiarity mandates that, when enacting legislation, “the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.”179 Whilst “the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market” is an exclusive competence of 
the EU,180 so that the principle of subsidiarity may be of limited application,181 past 
legislative practice indicates that subsidiarity is relevant to competition enforcement 
at national level.182  Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity has been linked to the 
decentralizing logic of Regulation 1/2003 more generally.183  Applying subsidiarity in 
this instance, it is arguable that its requirements are satisfied.  In particular, the 
preceding discussion demonstrated that voluntary convergence, taking place on a 
Member State-by-Member State level, is unlikely to result in the degree of 
consistency that the Commission considers necessary.  To the extent that a single 
“EU” approach is required, both theory and practice to date suggest that this must be 
devised and implemented, top-down, at EU-level. 
 
For similar reasons, the principle of proportionality would also, arguably, be satisfied.  
Pursuant to Article 5(4) TEU, proportionality requires that “the content and form of 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.”  Jurisprudential formulations are more extensive: proportionality requires 
that the means chosen to achieve a legitimate aim must be necessary, suitable, the 
least restrictive amongst the available alternatives, and cannot entail a 
disproportionate disadvantage relative to the aims pursued.184  Again, given the 
limitations of voluntary convergence, some measure of centralized coordination is 
clearly necessary in order to achieve the extent of harmonization desired.  As a means 
by which to achieve this aim, a regulation or relatively prescriptive directive appears 
to be a suitable instrument, particularly since it is possible, in theory, to achieve 
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uniformity in terms of both implementation and the content of the rules to be applied.  
Finally, the preceding discussion of means by which to achieve convergence suggests 
that there are unlikely to be less restrictive—whilst equally effective—alternatives 
available.  If we accept that convergence is a legitimate goal, then proceeding by way 
of EU-level legislation is a proportionate response. 
 
c. Desirability of convergence 
 
What may be more difficult, however, is to generate the necessary political support.  
In particular, we return to a fundamental objection noted above: that existing 
disparities with respect to fining practices may not provide a sufficiently compelling 
problem so as to merit such a notable incursion into national procedural sovereignty, 
or even a worthwhile use of (relatively scare) legislative time.  Insofar as the ECN, 
and the decentralized enforcement framework more generally, are premised upon 
equality between the Commission and the NCAs in the application of EU competition 
law, re-centralization of fining practices at EU level might be perceived as an attempt 
to undermine the autonomy and authority of the Member State agencies.  Even if 
fining practices are to be construed, on the basis of the effectiveness argument, as 
comprising an integral aspect of the substantive antitrust prohibitions, it is not 
immediately obvious that the Member States will be prepared to cede jurisdiction.  In 
the energy markets example, discussed above, greater harmonization had a strong 
ideological dimension linked to an emphatic (though not universal) belief in the 
necessity of liberalisation.  By contrast, it was as a result of political disagreements at 
Council level that the division of labour between NCAs and the Commission was not 
addressed in greater detail in Regulation 1/2003 itself.185  Accordingly, achieving 
increased convergence requires a political commitment to, and acceptance of, greater 
centralization on the part of the Member States, in addition to the readily apparent 
enthusiasm of the Commission. 
 
VI. The Contours of Convergence: Which Standards? 
 
Accepting that increased convergence may be desirable and feasible, perhaps the most 
contentious outstanding issue is the shape that such convergence might take.  Given 
that this requires the identification and adoption of a defined single standard, what 
rules should be mandated to govern future fining practices, and how should these 
rules take effect? 
 
The most straightforward approach, and one which appears to find greatest favour in 
competition jurisdictions internationally, is the adoption of uniform guidelines to 
inform and shape fining practices across the EU.186  The use of fining guidelines 
would generate a degree of coherence in terms of the methodology applied by public 
enforcers, leading (at least in theory) to greater consistency in levels of fines imposed.  
Fining guidelines should, therefore, increase both convergence and certainty.  Most 
NCAs already utilise some form of defined fining methodology,187 so that, in most 
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instances, what would be required is simple alignment of existing disparate practices.  
Moreover, many of the critiques of sentencing guidelines, particularly as these exist in 
the context of criminal law,188 appear less relevant in relation to administrative fines 
levied upon economic undertakings with no question of custodial sentences, and 
where unlimited judicial discretion is arguably less necessary or defensible. 
 
The first, most obvious model that might inform the development of centralised 
guidance is the Commission’s own fining practice under its 2006 Guidelines.  Use of 
Commission practice as a benchmark for comparison of competition enforcement 
processes across the EU is a common occurrence,189 which fits with an established 
process of “Europeanisation” of competition law, whereby, frequently, centralised EU 
procedures provide the model for domestic enforcement arrangements.190  Whilst 
there is no single recognised international ‘best practice,’ the Commission’s approach 
might credibly be seen as illustrative of amongst the best practices globally.191  For its 
part, following the 2006 reforms, the Commission takes the view that the revised 
Guidelines work well, and it has no apparent plans for further revision.192  Clearly, 
from a practical—if not exactly a principled—perspective, simply adopting the EU-
level rules on sanctioning would provide the quickest and most straightforward means 
by which to realise greater convergence.193  Moreover, the 2006 Guidelines are 
underpinned by a well-developed jurisprudence of the Union courts, which have 
elaborated upon the concepts and requirements within the Guidelines, thus increasing 
certainty and consistency. 
 
It is not the case, however, that Commission practice should be accepted 
unquestioningly as the default.194  First, the methodology set out in the 2006 
Guidelines has received criticism from many commentators, particularly practitioners.  
Objections include its unpredictability;195 the proportionality of sanctions, given the 
very high level of fines imposed;196 and the (allegedly undue) deference afforded to 
the Commission when sanctions are challenged before the Union Courts.197  These 
critiques are, likewise, reflected to an extent in Member State practice, in which cases 
of deliberate and informed divergence can be identified.198  The recurrent use of 
indicative percentage fines in Member State practice, for instance, suggests that 
NCAs may prefer a somewhat less Delphic approach to the formulation of fines than 
                                                 
188 See e.g. Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal 
Courts, University of Chicago Press, 1998, and Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing 
Guidelines: Exploring the English Model, OUP, 2013. 
189 Cseres (2010). 
190 Cseres (2014), and Cengiz (2012), p.128-129. 
191 Lianos et al. (2014), pp. 12-14 & 127. 
192 Ten Year of Regulation 1/2003, paras.212-213. 
193 See also Dannecker & Körtek (2004), pp.99-100. 
194 A viewpoint supported by, inter alia, Ost (2014), p.135. 
195 Geradin (2011), pp.31-36; Solek (2015); and Hans Gilliams, “Proportionality of EU Competition 
Fines: Proposal for a Principled Discussion” 37 World Competition 435 (2014), 451. 
196 Gilliams (2014); Ian S. Forrester, “A Challenge for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in 
Competition Cases” 36 European Law Review 185 (2011), 206-207. 
197 Forrester (2011). 
198 For example, prior to its adoption of standalone fining guidelines in October 2014, the Italian 
Competition Authority applied the Commission’s guidelines.  The new guidelines are modelled 
primarily on the ECA Principles, and thus involve numerous departures from the 2006 Guidelines: see 
Francesca Ammassari, “Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines for Infringemnts of Competition 
Law: Key Issues,” 3 Italian Antitrust Review 231 (2014). 
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the Commission.  This links to a further objection, turning upon the regulatory 
competition concept: namely, that the centrality (and perceived superiority) of the 
2006 Guidelines may obstruct regulatory innovation, insofar as any deviation is 
perceived as misguided, regardless of its substantive merits.199   
 
An alternative basis for alignment may be found, instead, in the ECA Principles.  As 
noted, in 2008 the ECA devised and adopted model guidance for NCAs on fining, 
which, moreover, has prompted or informed subsequent voluntary revisions to the 
fining practices of numerous NCAs.200  The key advantage of the ECA Principles is 
that, because they were devised in a largely decentralised process involving input 
from numerous NCAs, they may reflect more accurately the existing consensus across 
the EU with respect to fining practices at national level.  By incorporating these 
principles into a hard law instrument, the vagaries and inconsistencies of reliance 
upon voluntary convergence may be avoided. 
 
It is difficult to anticipate, however, that more widespread adoption of the ECA 
principles, as these exist currently, might generate the increased convergence 
required.  Consensus, in this instance, also means compromise.  Specifically, the ECA 
Principles reflect “general principles shared by the European Competition 
Authorities,” some of which are pitched at a notably high or abstract level, and many 
of which allow NCAs considerable flexibility with respect to specific rules 
adopted.201  For example, the ECA Principles recommend the adoption of a maximum 
statutory fine, but do not specify the appropriate figure or percentage.202  Similarly, 
the ECA Principles suggest that the value of sales affected provides an “appropriate” 
(but not a necessary) basis for calculation of fines, but are notably vague in terms of 
how this value is to be calculated, and give little guidance as to what percentage of 
value of sales should be applied in particular circumstances.203  Thus, while adoption 
of the ECA Principles may provide a useful starting point from which NCAs can 
coordinate the broad brushstrokes of their fining practices, as currently formulated 
they are insufficiently precise and/or prescriptive to result in coherent alignment of 
the mechanics of fining across the EU.  Moreover, the absence of judicially-defined, 
binding interpretations as to the meaning of the provisions contained in the ECA 
Principles, coupled with their abstract nature, may lead to divergent interpretations of 
ostensibly harmonised concepts, 204 and thus would likely require clarification from 
the Union Courts. 
 
It is suggested, instead, that any effort to increase convergence should reflect the 
benefits of both the Commission and ECA approaches.  The content of the rules 
                                                 
199 Frese (2014), p.255. 
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adopted should be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the same methodology and 
parameters apply across the EU.  Whilst it may be necessary to incorporate a degree 
of flexibility, in order to enable NCAs to reflect local circumstances that may impact 
upon the operation or impact of sanctions within their jurisdiction,205 this should 
occur within the context of the agreed methodology.  Member States should be fully 
involved in devising the details of convergence: any assumption that the 2006 
Guidelines necessarily reflects superior practice is inappropriate.  It might, therefore, 
be advisable to establish a working group on fining practices at EU level to delimit 
the agreed principles, including Member State representatives.206  It is important to 
reach agreement on all aspects of the fining calculation, including more peripheral 
elements such as determining the parameters of the undertaking subject to the fine 
(particularly problematic in the context of large organisations with multiple 
subsidiaries), and the interaction with leniency programmes.207  Devising optimal 
principles for sanctioning can be informed by economic learning,208 yet, ultimately, 
the choice of determinants for fining practice—for example, selection of a particular 
percentage turnover cap—is essentially abstract in nature,209 and thus necessitates 
certain policy-based as opposed to purely legal choices. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider how such principles should take effect within 
national systems.  As the discussion in Section V demonstrated, in order to secure a 
sufficiently coherent and meaningful increase in convergence, any guidelines enacted 
must have legally binding effect at Member State level.  That is, NCAs (and the 
Commission) must be legally obliged to follow these principles in their fining 
practices in response to breaches of EU competition law.  A broadly consistent 
application of the mechanics of fining is necessary to ensure that all fines imposed 
take account of the same relevant factors in determination of the magnitude of any 
penalty, and also to reflect a consistent approach to policy questions such as the need 
for deterrence, the liability of parent undertakings, and the extent to which broader 
social considerations may affect fines imposed.  As discussed, the relatively 
prescriptive nature of this task suggests that harmonisation by Regulation is perhaps 
the most straightforward approach.  However, use of a Directive in this instance may 
create greater scope for a more nuanced incorporation of fining principles into the 
domestic administrative structure. 
 
Yet, as our assessment in Section III of the ambiguous merits of certainty illustrated, 
calculation of competition fines is not an exact science.  As cases such as AC-
Treuhand demonstrate,210 an overly rigid application of any fining guidelines could 
result in fines set at inappropriate levels in certain instances.  Therefore, whilst greater 
convergence will only be possible if competition authorities are legally obliged to 
align the mechanics of fining practice, there is a converse need to retain a degree of 
flexibility in law within any harmonised framework, both in order to tailor fines to 
specific situations and to avoid excessive predictability.  Accordingly, any mandatory 
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fining guidelines must allow for the exercise of discretion by NCAs in individual 
cases, and, potentially, even permit a departure from the specified principles in 
exceptional individual cases.  In order to ensure that such discretion is not misused, 
NCAs should be obliged to explain and justify any departure from the approach of the 
guidelines with a sufficiently comprehensive statement of reasons in each instance.211   
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
This article has considered the prospects and options for achieving increased 
convergence with respect to fining practices of the NCAs and the Commission in 
response to antitrust violations across the EU.  Undoubtedly, convergence must 
connote greater coherence and consistency in the approach to calculation of fines by 
diverse public enforcers, but it cannot require full uniformity of fining levels as such.  
Although it is difficult to maintain that convergence is required as a matter of EU 
law, its desirability is less contentious.  In particular, a fairness-focused argument 
premised on the principle of equality supports greater convergence in order to ensure 
more equal treatment of defendants where the same substantive competition rules are 
applied by parallel enforcers.   
 
Although considerable convergence has occurred organically, this article concluded, 
as the Commission itself has done, that increased convergence of the degree 
envisaged is likely to require a more concrete mandatory solution. On the one hand, 
this would represent a departure from the existing norm of a decentralised 
enforcement framework where the Member States are, ostensibly, equal partners with 
the Commission.  On the other, calculation of competition fines is, largely, a technical 
task, arguably triggering fewer concerns regarding national sovereignty than other 
areas of antitrust (such as private enforcement).  On balance, it is submitted that 
increased convergence is achievable and advantageous both to the EU and to the 
NCAs.   
 
What is less immediately obvious is the choice of standards to be adopted: the notion 
of the effective application of EU competition law, though powerful in many respects, 
provides little indication of which level of sanctions is required.  Whilst the basic 
framework of fining methodology is relatively uncontroversial, it is clear that, for the 
further convergence to emerge, there must be agreement on more than the broadest 
contours of fining practice.  Accordingly, across the various public enforcers, there is 
a need for consistency in terms of the more mechanical aspects of fining, even though 
distinct breaches prosecuted by diverse enforcers may still attract differing fines.  
Once the case for increased convergence has been made successfully at a political 
level, it is vitally important to develop a workable framework that can guide 
sanctioning across a multitude of differently situated enforcers, balancing the need for 
flexibility and sufficient consistency in practice.  These are the key challenges ahead. 
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